The Geedge Networks
Leak Analysis

On September 2025, 600GB of internal data from Geedge Networks and the MESA Lab was exposed. This is the first definitive blueprint of the GFW's internal architecture.

The "TSG" Architecture

The leaks identify the Traffic Secure Gateway (TSG) as the primary censorship appliance. It is a rack-mounted FPGA unit deployed at provincial ISP exchange points, capable of line-speed Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).

> Component: TSG-4000
> Module: Entropy_Scanner_v9.2
> Target: "High-Entropy Streams" (Shadowsocks/VMess)

The "Active Probing" Logic

The MESA Lab logs reveal that the GFW does not just block; it probes. When the TSG detects a suspicious connection (e.g., a standard Shadowsocks handshake), it sends a "replay attack" packet to the server.

1. Connection flagged (High Entropy).
2. TSG sends fake client handshake.
3. Server responds = BLOCK IP.
4. Server ignores/redirects = PASS.

The "Human" Weakness

The most shocking revelation is that the GFW is not an omnipotent AI. The leaks contained Jira tickets, bug reports, and Excel spreadsheets managed by humans.

This confirms that the "Great Firewall" is a bureaucratic software project. It has bugs. It has deployment schedules. And like all software, it has exploits. Our methodology leverages these human delays. When VLESS-Reality changes its fingerprint, it takes the MESA engineers weeks to update the TSG firmware. That is your window of opportunity.